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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
MYRA K. BUTLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MARVIN JAY BUTLER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
NO. 11662 
CASE 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition of defendant for modification of a 
decree of divorce and for a ruling in contempt. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court dismissed the petition of defendant except 
that the court modified the decree to allow defendant (a) 
to take his minor children as dependents on his income tax 
returns and ( b) to delete plaintiff as a beneficiary of his 
family trust. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and appellant requests an order directing 
the court below either to amend the decree of divorce as 
prayed in his petition or, in the alternative, to find the 
plaintiff in contempt. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 17, 1967, the District Court entered a decree 
of divorce terminating the marriage of the parties who were 
then residents of Davis County, Utah. Defendant is a com. 
mercial pilot employed by Western Airlines and has since 
moved to San Mateo, California, a suburb of San Francisco, 
his base of operations. Plaintiff married one Joseph 
Seethaler on February 14, 1968 and now resides in Provo, 
Utah. 
Under the decree of divorce, defendant was granted 
custody of his minor children for three months, Jurn 
through August, of each year. The decree required that 
defendant give notice on or before May 1 of each year of his 
intention to exercise his right of custody and of the date on 
which he would take custody. 
The children of the parties and their dates of birth 





July 30, 1946 
February 17, 1952 
November 17, 1955 
July 11, 1961 
The three last named children are minors. 
From the date of the divorce until May 29, 1968, de· 
fendant visited his children and was visited by them on 
numerous occasions. The nature of his employment per· 
mitted him to provide transportation between Utah ano 
California at minimum expense and discomfort. (R. 126· 
127) 
On April 25, 1968, defendant delivered to plaintifl 
written notice dated April 20, 1968 of his intention to tak1 
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custody of the minor children on May 27, 1968 and request-
ing that he be allowed to pick up certain items of clothing 
and personal property on May 20, 1968. (Exhibit , R. 
127-128) 
Between April 25 and May 20, 1968, defendant had 
several telephone conversations with his children. His 
daughter, Julie, asked that he enroll her in summer school 
classes in English and driver's training, which he did. (R. 
129) During this period, he received no indication that 
there would be any difficulty in obtaining custody of the 
children as provided in the decree. 
On May 20, 1968, defendant went to plaintiff's resi-
dence in Provo for the purpose of picking up the requested 
items of clothing and personal property of the children. As 
a result of plaintiff's interference, defendant was unable to 
obtain the requested items, as the following testimony 
shows: 
"Q. I see. Now did you go to Provo on May the 
20th for the purpose of picking up these belongings? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what occurred when you arrived in 
Provo? 
A. I drove to the house where they were living. 
I was driving a pickup truck. And I backed into their 
driveway. And my children came out the door. 
They knew what I was there for. They came out 
the door and I told them to bring their belongings. 
' 
My daughter, Julie, brought out her violin and a 
pasteboard box with some papers in it and a few scraps 
of sewing fabric, some miscellaneous items. 
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They brought two old bicycles. One that had pre. 
viously belonged to John was of a size a little smaller 
than his and in total disrepair, and a bicycle that be. 
longed to my daughter, and which also hasn't been 
used for several years. 
Q. Did the children have new bicycles? 
A. Yes. John and Bret had new bicycles. 
Q. Who had purchased those bicycles? 
A. I had. I gave Bret a new bicycle for his birth 
day, and about a week later he told me that his mother 
had provided him with a new bicycle. And it's my 
understanding that she claims having had no income 
whatsoever for that summer, and so I presume that 
inasmuch as I was providing her support that I had 
provided the bicycle for her. 
Q. In any event, they had new bikes; Is that 
right, 
A. That's true. 
Q. But you didn't get them for that purpose: 
You didn't get them on May the 20th for the children: 
A. No, no. No, I never did get those. 
Q. Did you get the items requested on your no· 
tice? 
A. No. The children came to me with these few 
things and I said: "Where's the rest of your belong· 
ings ?" 
And they told me their mother forbid them from 
bringing any other belongings. 
And I said to Julie: "Will you please go and get 
the list and let's go over it?" 
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So she did. She went into the house and came out 
with the list. And it was very painful for her. 
I asked her to go in and ask her mother about this 
or that, and she would go into the house-she went 
into the house two or three times. And the second time 
she came out in tears and I said: "Why are you crying?" 
And she said: "This is so difficult. Mother won't 
give me anything, and here you are to take them. And 
I don't know what to do." 
And I comforted her. I told her that I loved her; 
there was no reason for her to have to go through this, 
and not to worry about it. 
And my son, John, simply went into the house and 
disappeared. I didn't see him any longer. 
That's all I got, and I left. (R. 130-31) 
Defendant returned to California expecting to return 
to Provo on May 27 to assume custody of the children. On 
May 24, he received a telephone call from Julie and Jon who 
indicated that they didn't want to come to California, that 
they would come for part of the summer but not for the 
entire summer. Defendant told the children that he would 
expect them to be ready to go with him as previously ar-
ranged and the conversation terminated with the under-
standing that he would call for them in Provo between 
eleven o'clock and noon on May 27. (R. 132-33) 
On May 27, 1968, defendant went to plaintiff's house 
in Provo to obtain custody of the children at the appointed 
hour. There was no one home although he remained at the 
house for some time. After repeated telephone calls from 
Provo and later from Salt Lake City, he reached Jon at 
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plaintiff's residence at seven-thirty in the evening. Ht 
instructed Jon to get his belongings together and to tell thE 
other children to do likewise and that he would return fo 
Provo within the hour to get them. Upon his return tiJ 
Provo that evening, he found plaintiff's house dark. AJ. 
though there were two cars in the driveway, no one an. 
swered the door. He attempted to telephone plaintiff's 
residence repeatedly until eleven o'clock without success, 
although he did receive a busy signal on one occasion. (R 
134-35) 
The next morning, May 28, he commenced calling plain· 
tiff's residence at six-thirty, only to find the telephom 
busy. At seven o'clock he went to plaintiff's residence. 
concerning which he testified as follows: 
Q. And what happened at 7 :00 o'clock in the 
morning? 
A. Little Bret came to the door, and I spoke to 
him and I-
Q. (interposing) How old is he at the time, by 
the way? 
A. He was 6. 
Q. All right. And you spoke to him and what1 
A. I spoke to him, told him to get his things, ana 
asked him where Julie and John were. 
And he said he didn't know and that he would get 
his things, and he closed the door. 
And then I waited for 15 minutes, and then I ran! 
the bell again and a young man appeared at the door 
whom I had never seen before-a young man in his 
20's, I judged. 
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And I asked him about Julie and John and he said: 
"They slept with friends last night." 
And I said : "Do you know where they are?" And 
he said: "No." 
And I said : "Do you know what friends?" And he 
said: "No." 
And I said: "Did they stay at the same place or at 
separate places?" And he said: "At separate places." 
And I said: "Did you take them there?" And he 
said: "No." 
And I said: "You do know that they stayed at 
separate places, but you didn't take them there or you 
don't know where they are?" And he said: "That's 
right." 
So I asked his name, and he said that it was Carl 
Seethaler. And he asked me mine. I told him my name 
and that I was the children's father and that I had come 
to get them. And he said: "I don't think they want to 
go." 
And I said to him: "Well, that's a matter to be 
decided between them and me, and I've come to get 
them." 
And he said: "That's your problem." 
And I said: "Please bring their mother. I want to 
talk to her." 
And he said: "No, I won't. She's asleep and I 
won't wake her." 
And I said: "Please bring Bret to the door." 
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And he said: "I won't." And then he came out the 
door and seemed to go to his car, and left me standing 
on the front porch." 
And in a moment he came back and asked me to 
move my car as it was blocking the driveway. 
So I suggested to him that he might bring Bret ti: 
me while I moved my car, and he said: "Well, I'll tell 
him but that's all I'll do." 
So I moved my car, and the young man left. 
Q. Did Bret come to the door? 
A. Then Bret came to the door. 
Q. After the boy had left? 
A. After the boy had driven away. 
Q. All right. 
A. Bret came to the door, and he looked at me in 
a rather pained way, and he said: "Daddy, I'll be here 
with my bag in a minute," and he disappeared. 
I waited for a few more minutes on the porch and 
then I went back and sat in my car, and the only activity 
that I observed between that time and 8 :00 o'clock in 
the morning was to see the young man return and dis· 
appear into the house. 
Q. Carl Seethaler? 
A. Carl Seethaler. 
Q. Did Bret come back? Did Bret come? 
A. No, Bret didn't come. 
So at 8 :00 o'clock I went back and rang the bell, 
the doorbell. And Carl Seethaler came to the door and 
I said: "Is Bret ready yet?" And he said: "No." 
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I said: "Please bring him, because I have an air-
plane to catch." 
And he said: "He told me that he doesn't want to 
go." And he closed the door in my face. 
And I knocked on the door and I rang the bell 
several times, and there was no response, and I left. It 
was necessary for me to get back to work that day and 
I left." (R. 135-38) 
During the ensuing week, defendant reached the child-
ren by telephone from California and told them that he 
would call for them on June 4. On that date, he was advised 
by his former attorney to enlist the assistance of the Provo 
City Police or the Utah County Sheriff in obtaining custody 
of the children. The Sheriff of Utah County refused to offer 
such assistance. (R. 138-40) 
Defendant learned that plaintiff had moved but was 
unable to learn her new address. He therefore called the 
business establishment of plaintiff's husband, ( Seethaler's, 
Inc. meat packing plant) where he was able to speak to his 
son, Jon, who, then twelve years of age, was working in the 
plant. He learned that plaintiff's residence was somewhere 
in the Indian Hills residential area of Provo. (R. 139-40) 
Later in the morning of June 4, defendant went to 
Indian Hills where he drove around until he was able to 
identify plaintiff's residence by the cars parked in the 
driveway. He then secured the services of present counsel 
with whom he returned that evening at which time he was 
able to speak with Julie and learned that Jon and Bret had 
been taken to Heber City on a swimming trip by Carl See-
thaler. (R. 141-42) 
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On the morning of June 5, defendant was able to ob-
tain custody of Bret from the plaintiff and, over resistance 
and in spite of intimidation, succeeded in picking up Jon 
at the Seethaler plant where he was at work. Plaintiff re-
fused, however, to provide other than a few items of old 
clothing for Bret and nothing for Jon. Defendant was un-
able to obtain custody of Julie. (R. 145-47) 
Defendant took Jon and Bret to Salt Lake City where 
he purchased adequate clothing for them and then to the 
home of his brother in Ogden to spend the night before 
leaving for California. During the night, Jon called his 
mother, who instructed him to meet her at a certain inter-
section in Ogden. She and Mr. Seethaler then drove to 
Ogden and took Jon back to Provo, all without defendant's 
knowledge or consent. (R. 148-51) 
On June 6, with the aid of counsel and the Provo City 
Police, defendant, after much difficulty, was able to again 
obtain custory of Jon who had returned to work at the 
Seethaler plant. (R. 150-54) Defendant then returned to 
California where he and the two boys had a pleasant and 
enjoyable summer together. (R. 154-56) After returning 
the boys to Provo at the end of the summer, defendant had 
a five-day visit with all three children at Flaming Gorge, 
Wyoming. The relationship between the defendant and his 
children is one of love and affection and was such at the 
end of the summer. (R. 157) 
In view of the conduct of plaintiff as set forth above, 
defendant in September filed his petition requesting that 
he be given full custody of the children, or, alternatively, 
that sanctions be imposed adequate to secure defendant's 
rights under the decree. At the hearing of the petition, 
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defendant sought to introduce testimony of subsequent and 
continuing conduct of plaintiff in violation of the terms of 
the decree. The court refused to admit such testimony and 
refused to allow amendment of the petition to re-date it as of 
the date of the hearing. Defendant testified, however, that 
plaintiff had embarked upon a continuing course of conduct 
having as its objective the alienation of his children's af-
fection. (R. 160-62) 
The only evidence in this case was the testimony of the 
defendant, which was unrefuted. At the close of defendant's 
case, plaintiff moved to dismiss on the ground that defend-
ant had failed to state a cause of action. With the exception 
of two minor modifications to the decree (allowing defend-
ant to claim the children as deductions for tax purposes and 
to delete plaintiff as a beneficiary of his family trust), 
plaintiff's motion was granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
In connection with his petition, defendant moved for 
a change of venue to the Fourth Judicial District for Utah 
County where plaintiff and the children reside. The govern-
ing law is Section 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
which provides that venue in such actions must be "in the 
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county 
in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the 
action." Although Mr. Butler is nominally the defendant 
and Mrs. Seethaler the plaintiff, it is clear that Mr. Butler 
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stands in the position of a plaintiff bringinv an action 
against Mrs. Seethaler for breach of the term;; of the decree 
and of the settlement agreement. The n1use of action arose 
by reason of acts performed by Mrs. Seethaler in Utah 
Utah County. 
By either standard, residence of "defendant" or county i 
in which the cause of action arose, venue was proper only : 
in Utah County, and the denial of defendant's motion for '! 
change of venue was in error. 
A second and more persuasive reason for granting the 
defendant's motion for change of venue was the fact that l 
it was a matter of convenience to the court and litigants to 1 
have the matter heard in Utah County rather in Davis ! 
County. All of the witnesses reside in Utah County, counsel , 
for one of the parties resides in Utah County, the defendant i 
was a resident of Utah County, the cause for complaint : 
arose in Utah County, and the Provo Court is not substan- • 
I 
tially further in time and distance for counsel for the , 
plaintiff. As a matter of orderly administration of the file i 
and the availability of prompt relief, Utah County was the 
logical county to consider the petition of defendant. Section 
78-13-9 ( 3) Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) provides that. 
"when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice ! 
would be promoted by the change," the court may grant a 1 
change of venue. 
It seems to the defendant that all of the reasons neces-
sary for a change of venue existed in this case and were, 
in fact, compelling upon the court. The subsequent circum· 
stances of this case, involving difficulty in getting to court 
and having the matter disposed of quickly and effectively, 
demonstrated the merits of defendant's request for a change 
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vi' . c :1: 1 t' Th P t ourt' s failure to do so was an abuse of dis-
Cft'. iOJL 
POINT II 
i. (lt:nT ERRED IN EXCLUDING AS HEARSAY 
CFRT:._J>: TESTIMONY OFFERED BY DEFENDANT . 
. -\ 1 ;c\·ernl points in the course of the hearing, defendant 
offered test.i rnony as to conversations between defendant 
and his children for the purpose of showing that the child-
ren had been influenced by the mother in their decision 
not to go with defendant. Defendant also offered testimony 
as to statements by Joe, Al and Carl Seethaler to show their 
attempts to intimidate defendant and obstruct him in his 
lawful object of taking custody of his children. Most of 
such testimony was excluded as hearsay. (R. 142-45, 147-48, 
1151-53) In excluding this testimony the court was in er-
ror. 
It is widely recognized that in the interests of the child-
ren the usual prohibition against hearsay evidence must be 
relaxed in child custody cases. 
"It has many times been held that technical rules 
of practice and pleading are of little importance in 
determining issues concerning the custody of children. 
It is not only the right but the duty of the trial court 
to ascertain any and all facts, and make such investiga-
tions as, in his judgement, will assist him in reaching 
a proper conclusion as to the problems surrounding 
their custody to the end that he may determine the 
person who is best qualified and most suitable to fur-
nish the proper environments and home in which they 
are to live." Conley v. St. Jaques, 110 S.W. 2d 1238 
14 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937), citing Williams v. Guynes, 97 
S.W. 2d 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; cf. Annotation, · 
"Consideration of Investigations by Welfare Agency or 
the Like in Making or Modifying Award as Between 
Parents of Custody of Children," 35 A.L.R. 2d 629 
(1954). 
The courts have been willing, for example, to permit 
the judge in a custody proceeding to interview the child in ' 
chambers and to base his award of custody in whole or in 
part upon such interview. Such a case is Oakes v. Oakes, 
45 III. App. 2d 387, 195 N.E. 2d 840, 99A.L.R. 2d 949 (1964) 
in which the court observed, 
"To assume or hope that these proceedings are or 
can be molded in the character of a normal civil suit 
is naive and renders a disservice to the children who 
are the victims of this type of litigation." 99 A.L.R. 2d 
953. 
Thus in Callen v. Gill, 7 N.J. 312, 81 A.2d 495 (1951), 
where objection was made in a child custody case to testi-
mony as to conversations with the child as hearsay, the 
court observed: 
"The rules of evidence are somewhat relaxed in 
trials having to do with a determination of custody of 
an infant where it is necessary to learn of the child's 
psychology and preferences. Therefore, it is sometimes 
pertinent to bring to the court's knowledge the temper-
ament, disposition and reactions of the child by testi-
mony that borders upon heresay in that it embraces a 
recital of the child's remarks." 81 A.2d 498. 
The following text authority is also suggestive of an 
exception to the hearsay rule which would allow in evidence 
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. not only hearsay evidence of statements by the children in 
' this case but also statements by the Seethalers. 
"Statements may be original circumstantial evi-
dence of facts in issue, and are then admissible. They 
are admissible because the fact of their making throws 
light upon the question of the truth or falsity of the 
disputed facts; not because they state anything in re-
gard to the existence or non-existence of such facts, but 
because they in some way illustrate an attitude or state 
of mind or other evidential fact from which the main 
fact may be inferred. It will thus be noted that dec-
larations, in this sense, are not heresay, except in a lim-
ited sense." McKelvey, Evidence. Section 208 (1944). 
It is the general rule in Utah as elsewhere that hearsay 
evidence will be admitted where the words are offered not 
as being true but only as having been uttered. 
In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 
Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011 ( 1959), defendant's testimony 
in support of his application for expanded direct service 
between Ogden and the Salt Lake City Airport was "based 
upon his observations of the activities of others and in part 
upon their requests for and statements about desiring such 
service." In upholding an order of the Public Service Com-
mission based upon this testimony, the court held that such 
testimony was not hearsay since it "did not purport to as-
sure the truth of the statements but was a report about the 
conduct of people, including some of their verbal acts, as 
observed by him." 330 P.2d 1014. 
In Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953), 
the Supreme Court held that it was proper to admit into 
evidence testimony that the witness had heard the purchaser 
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of property promise that he would take it in his own name 
until plaintiff became of age at which time it would be 
turned over to plaintiff on the issue of whether a construc-
tive trust in favor of plaintiff should be imposed upon the 
property. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court quoted 
with approval the following language from Wigmore: 
"Where the utterance of specific words is itself 
a part of the details of the issue under the substantil'e 
law and the pleadings, their utterance may be proved 
without violation of the hearsay rule, because they are 
not offered to evidence the truth of the matter that 
may be asserted therein." 253 P.2d 374. Cf. Webb v. 
Webb, 116 Utah 155, 209 P.2d 201 (1949). 
A further exception to the hearsay rule of value in this 
case, is that for words offered as indicative of present men-
tal state or feelings at the time of the utterance. In Sine v. 
Harper, 118 Utah 425, 222 P.2d 571 (1950), an action for re-
formation of a deed on the ground of mutual mistake, the 
court held admissible for the purpose of showing the beliefs 
of the purchasers at the time of purchase statements made 
by them to their agent at that time. In support of its deci-
sion, the court quoted with approval the following language. 
"When the intention, feelings, or other mental 
state of a certain person at a particular time, including 
his bodily feelings, is material to the issues under trial, 
evidence of such person's declarations at the time in· 
dicative of his then mental state, even though hearsay. 
is competent as withi'ii an exception to the hearsay 
rule." 222 P.2d 577. 
At issue in this case is the question of plaintiff's willful 
and unlawful interference with and denial of defendant's 
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right to the custody of his children. Clearly relevant and 
material in that connection is evidence, in the form of state-
ments by the children, of any influence or pressure ap-
plied by the mother or others associated with her. Such 
testimony goes to the motive and state of mind of the child 
in refusing to accompany the father. Similarly relevant and 
material are statements by the Seethalers to defendant, 
offered not to establish their truth, but only to evidence 
the determination of those who made them to interfere with 
defendant's lawful rights. The court's exclusion of the of-
fered testimony was manifest error. 
POINT Ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND PLAIN-
TIFF IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND IN FAILING TO 
ENFORCE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT UNDER THE DE-
CREE TO CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN. 
It is generally recognized that contempt is an appropri-
ate remedy and means of enforcement where a spouse dis-
regards the terms of a divorce decree by denying visitation 
rights or custody to the plaintiff. In Baker v. Baker, 119 
Utah 37, 224 P.2d 192 (1950), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a decree of the District Court finding the wife in 
contempt of court for depriving her husband of visiting 
rights contrary to the terms of the divorce decree. Cf., 
Kellogg v. Kellogg, 187 Ore. 617, 213 P.2d 172 (1949). 
The ordinary method of enforcing custody and visita-
tion rights is a contempt proceeding. For example, where a 
wife refuses to permit her husband to exercise his visitation 
rights, she is guilty of an indirect contempt of court and 
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the husband may institute a civil contempt proceeding to 
enforce his rights. Divorce and Separation, 8810, 24 Am. 
Jur 2d 920 (1966). 
In Goetz v. Goetz, 181 Kan. 128, 309 P.2d 655 (1957), 
the evidence supported a judgment of contempt against 
the divorced wife on the ground that she willfully refused 
to comply with the order of the District Court which had 
granted the husband the right of visitation of the minor 
children on alternate weekends away from their home and 
to have their care and custody for the first half of the 
summer vacation notwithstanding that the wife allegedly 
acted upon the advice of counsel. 
Plaintiff's conduct in denying and preventing defend· 
ant's lawful custody of his children was, under the foregoing 
authorities, a clear contempt of court. By the exercise of 
its power to hold plaintiff in contempt, the court could have 
enforced the terms of its decree ad afforded defendant the 
relief to which he is lawfully entitled. By its refusal t-0 
exercise that power the court acted in a manner inconsistent 
with its own decree and committed reversible error. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CHANGE 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN FROM PLAINTIFF TO 
DEFENDANT. 
The widely accepted and prevailing view is that con· 
duct of a parent having custody of a minor child which 
tends to alienate the affection of the child from its other 
parent is grounds for taking custody from the parent guilty 
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of such conduct. Annotation, "Alienation of Child's Affec-
tions as Affecting Custody Award," 32 A.L.R. 2d 1005 
(1953). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not decided 
this question, there is abundant authority from neighboring 
states, including the leading case of Thurman v. Thurman, 
73 Ida. 122, 245 P. 2d 810, 32 A.L.R. 2d 996 (1952). The 
recital of facts in that case included just such frustrating 
incidents of denial of visitation rights and alienation of af-
fection as comprise the record here. In granting a change of 
custody, the court, citing numerous authorities, stated the 
rule as follows: 
"The acts and conduct of the custodial parent, 
resulting in the alienation of the love and affection 
which children naturally have for the other parent, is 
a vital and very serious detriment to the welfare of 
such children and is grounds for modification of the 
decree with respect to such custody." 245 P.2d 814, 32 
A.L.R. 2d 1003. 
The court further observed that 
"Animosity on the part of the custodian toward a 
parent having a right to visit the child, inculcation of 
hate and disrespect on the part of the child for the 
other parent, refusal to comply with the provisions of 
the decree as to visitation privileges, mental incompe-
tency of the custodian, and other misconduct or unfit-
ness of the custodian may be considered." Ibid. 
The many authorities to the same effect are collected 
at the above cited annotation, 32 A.L.R. 2d 1005. In light 
of these authorities, plaintiff's conduct constitutes so fla-
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grant a disregard for defendant's rights and so concerted 
an effort to alienate the affections of his children that the 1 
court's refusal to grant the requested change of custody is 
an abuse of judicial discretion and should be reversed. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ATTORNEY'S:, 
FEES TO PLAINTIFF. ! 
l 
Adding insult to injury, plaintiff, after compelling i 
defendant to resort to litigation to enforce his rights under · 
the decree, had the temerity to ask for attorney's fees. Un- : 
I 
accountably, this request was granted by the trial court. 
I 
No evidence whatsoever was offered by plaintiff' 
other than an oral request for $750.00 in attorney's fees 
made by counsel at the close of his argument, which request 
was granted in the amount of $600.00. (R. 191). It is a 
principle of law firmly established in this state that, in 
the absence of a stipulation, attorneys fees may not be 
awarded except upon competent evidence. F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 ( 1965). As 
this Court recently stated : 
"There is merit in the defendant's challenge of the 
award of $775.00 attorneys fees to the plaintifff with-
out any evidence or stipulation in the record with re-
spect thereto. The plaintiff argues that this award is 
justified because of an 'advisory schedule of fees and : 
charges' published by the Salt Lake County Bar Associ-
ation. It is fundamental that the judgment must be 
based upon findings of fact, which in turn must be 
based upon the evidence. This rule has been followed by 
this court and other jurisdictions in regard to awarding 
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attorneys fees." 404 P.2d 673, citing numerous author-
ities. 
It is in fact doubtful that plaintiff is entitled to at-
torneys fees even if she produces evidence as to amount. 
Although defendant is unable to find any authority directly 
in point on the question of whether a wife is entitled to 
attorney's fees in a contempt action against her to enforce 
the terms of a divorce decree, on a related question it is 
said: 
"It is recognized in most of the states that the court 
may deny temporary alimony to a wife who is guilty 
of matromonial misconduct such as would authorize 
the husband to sue for a divorce or separation; and the 
court may also deny suit money under the same cir-
cumstance.<;;.'' Annotation "Wife's Misconduct or Fault 
as Affecting Her Right to Temporary Alimony or Suit 
Money," 2 A.L.R. 2d 307, 309 (1948). 
The above annotation adds: 
"Where the case has been tried on the merits, the 
husband is in a much better position to oppose the 
wife's application for temporary alimony and suit 
money than he would be if the application were heard 
before the evidence was fully presented to the court. 
And another factor enters the picture: After the case 
has been fully tried, the wife obviously does not need 
support money for the purpose of enabling her to live 
pending the trial, and so there is the factor of lack of 
need as well as the established guilt of the wife." Ibid. 
Although the cases cited in the above annotation are 
not in point on our specific question, they do reveal a general 
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policy on the part of the courts to deny attorney's fees to 
a wife in divorce litigation where the action is brought as 
a result of the wife's misconduct. 
The award of attorney's fees to the wife in divorce 
litigation is intended to remedy the economic disadvantage 
at which she often finds herself. No such policy considera. 
tion is present here. Indeed, by her obstructive tactics the 
plaintiff has put defendant to considerable unnecessary 
expense including the cost of repeated travel to Provo and 
substantial attorney's fees. Under these circumstances it 
was error to award attorney's fees to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that defendant is entitled to the relief re-
quested in his petition. In view of the error of the trial 
court, defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable 
Court direct the court below either ( 1) to enter its order 
amending the decree to change custody of the minor children 
to defendant or, in the alternative, (2) to find the plaintiff 
in contempt of the court's decree and to apply such sanctions 
as will secure defendant's rights thereunder. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson B. Howard, for: 
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